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Schopenhauer and the Stoics
JONATHAN HEAD
This paper considers the largely unexplored relation between Schopen-
hauer’s metaphysical system of Will and the philosophical therapy offered
by Stoicism. By focusing on three key texts from disparate points in
Schopenhauer’s philosophical career, as well as considering live debates
regarding the metaphorical nature of his thought and his soteriology, I
argue that the general view of straightforward opposition between
himself and the Stoics is not the correct one. Rather, there are deep paral -
lels to be found between the therapeutic aspects of The World as Will and
Representation (WWR) and the ethical recommendations made by the
ancient Stoics. I will argue, further, that Schopenhauer recognised these
similarities between his thought and Stoic ethics, often defending what he
sees as the true essence of Stoicism. I conclude with some thoughts
regarding the adoption of Stoic ideals by Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, in
relation to their reading of Schopenhauer’s work.
I
Michael Ure offers us a familiar picture of Nietzsche, in Human,
All Too Human mostly but also Dawn to some extent, turning away from
Schopenhauerian salvation, in which one engages in practices of self-
denial designed to mortify the will, towards a Stoic ‘self-fashioning’, in
which we attempt to construct a ‘stable, mild, and basically cheerful
soul’1 that does not draw away from others, as more egocentric therapies
are liable to do. Not only that, Ure writes, ‘Taking his lead from the
Hellenistic schools, Nietzsche develops a philosophical therapy that turns
on resisting the seductions of the metaphysical and religious chimeras of
1 Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, trans. by R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 34.
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a transcendent world’2. So, it seems that, in his ‘Middle Period’, Nietz-
sche turns away from a Schopenhauerian soteriology, or theory of salva-
tion, and towards a Stoic philosophical therapy, in order to escape from
the metaphysical trappings of his system, as well as to avoid encouraging
therapies that would lead to individuals turning away from the world and
others. In something of a contrast, in a recent paper, ‘Schopenhauer’s
Influence on Wittgenstein’, Severin Schroeder has suggested that
Tractatus-era Wittgenstein holds to a Stoic ethical ideal garnered from his
reading of Schopenhauer.3 Somewhat paradoxically, then, Schopenhauer
appears to have acted as a catalyst for both a turning away from Stoicism
(in the case of Nietzsche) and a turning towards it (in the case of Wittgen-
stein). The paradox may only be apparent, though – after all, it was the
content and practical consequences of Schopenhauer’s system that turned
Nietzsche towards Stoicism, whilst it could be the simple fact that the
Stoics are mentioned in W W R and thereby brought to Wittgenstein’s
attention that is a sufficient explanation for his dalliance with Stoic
ethical ideals. As such, despite Wittgenstein adopting a Stoic-style ethics
due to his reading of Schopenhauer, we can still see the latter in this
picture as fundamentally opposed to Stoicism.
One example of the widespread assumption that Schopenhauer
rejects Stoicism wholesale is provided by Peter Lewis, who states that
Schopenhauer regards Stoicism ‘as merely an estimable guide to the
rational life and [an ethical view] to which the very idea of salvation is
incomprehensible’, and thus as a view that compares unfavourably to the
ascetic traditions found in Christianity and Hinduism4. In a recent work,
Vandenabeele has also sought to argue for a stark contrast between
Schopenhauer and the Stoics, stating that ‘[Schopenhauer’s] own ideal of
the complete denial of the will is very different from stoic ataraxia or
apatheia’,5 a view echoed by Julian Young in a recent paper, who argues
that Schopenhauer’s denial of the will has to retain a ‘transcendent’ char-
2 Michael Ure, Nietzsche’s Therapy: Self-Cultivation in the Middle Works  (Lanham,
MD: Lexington Books, 2008), p. 128.
3 Severin Schroeder, ‘Schopenhauer’s Influence on Wittgenstein’, in A Companion
to Schopenhauer, ed. by Vandenabeele (Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012),
pp. 367-384 (p. 368).
4 Peter Lewis, ‘Review: Sophia Vasalou, Schopenhauer and the Aesthetic
Standpoint: Philosophy as a Practice of the Sublime’ , Philosophical
Investigations, 37:4 (2014), pp. 383-386 (p. 386).
5 Bart Vandenabeele, The Sublime in Schopenhauer’s Philosophy (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 19.
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acter that is unavailable within a Stoic framework6. In contrast, I wish to
argue that Schopenhauer’s relation to the Stoics is not as straightforward
as is usually supposed, and is certainly not one of outright opposition. It
is not my purpose here to question Ure’s reading of Nietzsche, nor
Schroeder’s view of Wittgenstein’s philosophy; rather, I would like to
reflect upon whether Schopenhauer’s influence in these examples may be
more positive than has been presented, and whether in fact it is vestiges
of Stoicism inside Schopenhauer’s system that inspire Nietzsche and
Wittgenstein to explore a Stoic philosophical therapy. In this regard, I
wish to explore the question of whether one could pursue a Stoic-style
philosophical therapy within the framework of Schopenhauer’s philo-
sophy, and I will argue that Schopenhauer himself recognises deep paral-
lels between his system and Stoic ethics, even going so far as to express
great sympathy for the Stoic approach.
I will begin this investigation into Schopenhauer’s relation to the
Stoics in the following section by focusing on three key texts that encom-
pass both his earlier and later works; namely, 1) Chapter 16 of the first
volume of The World as Will and Representation (hence WWR1), which
the Longman translation entitles ‘Practical Reason Properly and Falsely
So-Called’, 2) its companion chapter in the second volume (hence
WWR2), entitled (by Schopenhauer this time) ‘On the Practical Use of
Our Reason and on Stoicism’, and finally 3) the section on the Stoics that
forms part of his ‘Fragments for the History of Philosophy’, which falls
in the first volume of Parerga and Paralipomena (hence PP1). I will
argue that Schopenhauer’s approach to Stoicism is more complex than
has been previously recognised, insofar as his criticism of particular Stoic
thinkers and extant Stoics texts sits alongside a general defence of what
he sees as the ‘true spirit’ of Stoicism. He is particularly keen to combat
any Stoic thinkers and texts that, as far as he sees it, corrupt the original
message of Stoicism. In addition, I will argue that we find a positive char-
acterisation of the Stoic sage by Schopenhauer as one who has under-
stood the pessimistic lessons of the metaphysics of Will – as such, we can
understand the Stoic sage, the representative of the ‘true spirit’ of
Stoicism, as an important figure in the context of Schopenhauer’s wider
soteriological scheme.
6 Julian Young, ‘Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Death and Salvation’, European Journal
of Philosophy, 16:2 (2008), pp. 311-324 (p. 323n.).
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In Section III, I will go on to reflect more generally on Schopen-
hauer’s soteriology and its similarities to Stoicism, with the intent of
answering those who may reject my interpretation immediately due to
potential conflict between the speculative parts of the Schopenhauerian
system (including the ‘self-denial of the Will’) and the more grounded
philosophy found in Stoicism. In particular, I will argue that if we adopt a
more metaphorical reading of Schopenhauer’s system, which a number of
scholars have begun to do, we can see his soteriology as sitting comfort-
ably with the Stoic ethical ideal of coming to terms with nature. To finish,
in section IV, I will offer some conclusions regarding what this may mean
for our understanding of Nietzsche in his ‘Middle Period’ and Tractatus-
era Wittgenstein’s adoption of the Stoic ideal. I will argue that we are left
with the possibility of interpreting Nietzsche and Wittgenstein as retriev-
ing Stoic aspects of their respective philosophies from their readings of
Schopenhauer.
II
In this section, I will examine three key texts in which Schopen-
hauer explicitly discusses Stoicism. I will argue that close analysis of
these texts reveals a multi-faceted approach to Stoicism on the part of
Schopenhauer – he is not afraid to paint the core message of Stoicism as
lying close to his soteriological scheme, and is even willing to go as far as
to criticise those who he feels have distorted that message.
The Stoic sage first makes his appearance in WWR1 in the context
of a discussion of reason in its practical employment. As part of his
critique of Kant, Schopenhauer seeks to strictly circumscribe the capacity
reason has to inform action. Reason affects action only insofar as its oper-
ations expand our sphere of knowledge beyond that which is immediate,
both spatially and temporally, by allowing us to have abstract knowledge:
[We] by virtue of knowledge in the abstract, comprehend not
only the narrow and actual present, but also the whole past and
future together with the wide realm of possibility. We survey
life freely in all directions, far beyond what is present and
actual.7
7 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, vol. 1, trans. by Payne (New
York: Dover, 1969), p.84.
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Clearly, an increased awareness of the realms of possibility, as well as
future consequences of our actions and the lessons of the past, will affect
our actions greatly, and it is reason that affords us such awareness. In that
way, and in that way alone, Schopenhauer thinks we can speak of reason
in its practical employment. Schopenhauer also claims that this is the
main attribute that marks human beings apart from other animals, and
thereby confirms our status as the highest grade of the Will’s manifesta-
tion in nature.
The ‘double life’ of humans, lived in both the abstract and the
concrete, not only impacts upon their actions, for it also can show itself in
their emotional life. Given that the production of our abstract knowledge
goes along the lines of a Humean ‘copy principle’ for Schopenhauer, the
cognitive life we lead through our abstract knowledge is going to be a
mere reflection of our concrete life, but crucially it is a calm one, where
‘what previously possessed him completely and moved him intensely
appears to him cold, colourless, and for the moment, foreign and strange;
he is a mere spectator and observer’.8 As such, whilst grounded in our
concrete, everyday life in response to which our emotions can often fluc-
tuate wildly, our abstract knowledge can give rise to cognitive processes
which can reflect dispassionately on events, both actual and possible
(Schopenhauer compares this to an actor stepping temporarily away from
the stage to act as a spectator of the play, before in time returning to the
action).
The Stoic sage comes in at this point, being described as ‘the most
perfect development of practical reason in the true and genuine sense of
the word, the highest point to which man can attain by the mere use of his
faculty of reason, and in which his difference from the animal shows
itself most clearly’.9 Such a statement is striking when considered within
the wider context of Schopenhauer’s soteriology and metaphysical
system, regardless of the critique of the historical development of ‘Stoic
ethics’ that follows it, and marks the idealised Stoic sage as potentially
one of the most important characters in his thought. How does one attain
salvation in Schopenhauer’s system? Whilst I cannot provide a detailed
answer to this question here, I would first note that for Schopenhauer
only human beings, as the highest grade of the Will’s manifestation, and
8 Ibid., p. 85.
9 Ibid., p. 86.
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as such the greatest development of reason within the world as represent-
ation, are able to attain escape from this world. A major reason for this is
the way in which our reason is able to widen our perspective upon the
world in which we find ourselves and the sort of existence we have
within it; we are able to grasp and come to know both the pain and suffer-
ing that dominates the world of representation through both space and
time, as well as the underlying unity behind all things. Schopenhauer’s
soteriological journey takes one through such a widening of perspective,
allowing a further insight into the truth about the world and about Will,
with an end-point in a perfect moment of self-knowledge, where the Will
fully recognises its own nature and recoils from itself in horror, thereby
extinguishing itself in some way.10 With this context in mind, when we
reconsider the earlier quote about the Stoic sage, we see quite strikingly
that this figure is placed close to the very pinnacle of the soteriological
scheme of WWR; they are someone whose life is most closely marked by
the widest perspective upon the surface and the essence of the world as it
really is, they are in that sense close, if not absolutely identical, to
Schopenhauer’s idealised ‘clear mirror of the will’. (It is also noteworthy
that on the emotional side of things, the Stoic will also be leading the
kind of calm, abstract life that I referred to earlier.) As such, given that
Schopenhauer’s philosophy is essentially soteriologically focused, the
Stoic sage is an incredibly important figure in his work.
The rest of the chapter is taken up with a critique of Stoic ethics in
general, as well as particular Stoic philosophers and their texts. Schopen-
hauer describes what he understands to be the source and
spirit of Stoics [… namely] the thought whether reason, man’s
great prerogative, which, through planned action and its result,
indirectly lightens the burden of life so much for him, might not
also be capable of withdrawing him at once and directly, i.e.,
through mere knowledge, either completely or nearly so, from
the sorrows and miseries of every kind that fill his life.11
This is undeniably an echo of the very essence of Schopenhauer’s philo-
sophy: reason, which is that which elevates us above all other beings in
the world as representation, reveals to us with ever greater clarity the pain
and suffering that characterises our existence, and the blind chaos under-
10 See ibid., pp. 378-98.
11 Ibid., p. 87.
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lying it all, such that we are driven to engage with ascetic and other prac-
tices in order to withdraw from the Will’s influence altogether. It is
important to note that this soteriological process is always accompanied
by a growth in knowledge: first, in self-knowledge constrained to the
individual, then graduating to the self-knowledge of the essence of the
world itself. Such a clear invocation of Schopenhauer’s very guiding-
principles in this description of the ‘spirit and true source’ of Stoicism,
therefore, cannot be accidental and should be taken to indicate a strong
underlying agreement between himself and Stoicism.
Michael Ure and Thomas Ryan in a recent paper have acknow-
ledged such a deep similarity, though they remark that the differences
between the two regarding the function of reason must always separate
them:
The Stoics assume that the correct use of reason can deliver
‘joy’ or ‘tranquillity’ in the sense of elevation above the
burdens and sorrows of life. Schopenhauer argues that this is
not possible because reason is only an instrument of the will…
For Schopenhauer, therefore, the only radical cure for life’s
suffering is not Stoic reason, but the complete denial of the
will12.
Ure and Ryan are correct in stating that reason is only an instrument of
the Will. However, within the context of Schopenhauer’s system, it is
crucially an instrument the Will can use to ultimately bring about its own
destruction (and thereby achieve the soteriological end-point). So, both
Schopenhauer and the Stoics share a view of reason as having a key
soteriological role, despite the secondary status the former gives to reason
from an ontological standpoint.
On the topic of reason and its relation to philosophical therapy,
then, Schopenhauer and the Stoics may not be as far apart as they might
seem. Indeed, a manuscript note from 1808 (or possibly 1809) makes it
quite clear that he sees himself as close to the Stoics on this point of the
role of reason in philosophical therapy. Here, Schopenhauer writes of a
possible problem of ineffectively railing against the evils of the world
through attributing disvalue to them directly, rather than seeing them
12 Michael Ure and Thomas Ryan, ‘Nietzsche’s Post-Classical Therapy’, Pli: The
Warwick Journal of Philosophy, 25 (2014), pp. 91-110 (p. 98).
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correctly as in fact ‘the image of that real and terrible evil’, glossed as
‘an actual evil existing in eternity and not in time’.13 Reason can aid in
diverting our attention away from the more directly perceived evils of the
phenomenal realm, towards the true super-sensible evil behind all things;
as such, it is key for an effective philosophical therapy that ‘[t]raining of
the faculty of reason enables us to perceive and avoid this delusion;
indeed this is what the Stoics had in mind’14. As such, the use of reason in
philosophical therapy, a notion he sees as inherited from the Stoics, is
clearly in Schopenhauer’s mind from the very beginnings of his philo-
sophical reflections on the evils of the world and the need for soteriology.
Going back to WWR1, we then find critiques of specific Stoic
thinkers, such as Epictetus and Zeno. The former is portrayed as acting in
conformity with the ‘spirit and aim of the Stoa’15 but then transitioning
into ‘a doctrine of virtue’ that argued pointlessly with the Peripatetics and
Epicureans. Zeno, likewise, is described as starting with a very Schopen-
hauerian principle of attempting to achieve ‘bliss through peace of mind’
and ‘[living] in harmony with himself’, which was later distorted and
modified by his successors who saw it as ‘too formal and empty […]
therefore [giving] it material content by the addition 'to live in harmony
with nature'’.16 The emphasis here, as elsewhere, is a deep unity between
Schopenhauerian philosophy and the ‘true spirit’ of Stoicism, with criti-
cism being offered of particular Stoics who seek to distort the true
essence of Stoicism in some way. Such a position is reiterated in a very
telling manuscript remark from 1814, where Schopenhauer even goes so
far as to suggest that the Stoics misunderstand their own ideal. The
remark is worth quoting in full:
It is a mistake for the Stoics to say that only the sage is happy.
On the contrary, he alone knows that on earth we cannot be
happy at all, that life is only a constantly prevented dying, an
illusion, and so forth. But through this knowledge of the essen-
tial nature of life the sage will never be capable of being very
pleased with or very depressed by the events of life, and thus he
will attain to genuine stoic indifference. But for this reason the
13 Schopenhauer, Manuscript Remains, vol. 1, trans. by Payne (Oxford: Berg, 1988),
p. 9.
14 Ibid. – my emphasis.
15 Schopenhauer, WWR, vol. 1, p. 88.
16 Ibid., p. 89.
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real sage will always possess a placid and silent melancholy
which is inseparable from a disappearance of the ordinary illu-
sions concerning life.17
Admittedly, one could read this as a rejection of the Stoic view of a
soteriological end-point in the character of the ‘sage’. However, it is just
as possible (and compatible with other passages we are considering) to
read this passage as a criticism of the Stoics for mishandling and ulti-
mately betraying their own ethical ideal, an ideal which Schopenhauer
has great sympathy for. Schopenhauer portrays the sage as knowing the
fundamental truths to be found in his system (such as the irredeemable
nature of the world as representation and the life we have within it) and
thereby attaining the state of mind that the Stoics are aiming for. Such a
theme of Schopenhauer portraying himself as a defender of a ‘true
Stoicism’, even to the extent of criticising specific Stoic figures, as well
as finding deep similarities between his philosophical therapy and that
offered by Stoicism, is continued in the companion chapter on practical
reason in volume two, which we shall turn to now.
Much of Schopenhauer’s chapter on the Stoics in WWR2 is in fact
taken up by a discussion of the Cynics, whom he styles as the precursors
of Stoicism:
the fundamental idea of cynicism is that life in its simplest and
most naked form, with the hardships that naturally belong to it,
is the most tolerable, and is therefore to be chosen. For every
aid, comfort, enjoyment, and pleasure by which people would
like to make life more agreeable, would produce only new
worries and cares greater than those that originally belong to
it.18
The Cynics, then, recognise one of the fundamental truths of Schopen-
hauer’s system: that our desires will inevitably make us suffer and there-
fore it is best to attempt to quell them as much as possible. However,
whereas Schopenhauer would seek to extinguish desire altogether, the
Cynics have a much more limited goal of reducing desires to a minimum
17 Schopenhauer, MR, vol. 1, p. 118.
18 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, vol. 2, trans. by Payne (New
York: Dover, 1969), p.153.
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whilst still keeping in touch with the human world and wider nature (thus,
there is no sense in Cynicism of escaping from an illusory world of
representation). In addition, Schopenhauer also accuses the Cynics of not
acting in humility,19 which also signals their continuing connection to the
world as representation.
Schopenhauer then characterises the evolution of Cynicism into
Stoicism as ‘changing the practical into the theoretical’,20 in that they did
not advocate dispensing of one’s possessions, but rather of changing
one’s attitude towards them, and seeing them more truthfully as products
of chance, liable to be taken away at any time. However, the focus on the
notion of psychological change, as opposed to the physical change advoc-
ated by the Cynics, soon lead the Stoics astray, allowing themselves to
feast at luxurious Roman parties, whilst at the same time proclaiming the
shallowness of the things they were enjoying; they forgot that ‘between
desiring and renouncing there is no mean’.21 Such a critique that we find
here, though, should not be understood as a critique of the ‘spirit of
Stoicism’ as such, but rather a critique of some of the Stoics and the
eudaemonism that some fall into. Arrian, for example is lauded for an
‘ascetic tendency’ that reflects the spirit of orientalism,22 a spirit that
Schopenhauer himself invokes on numerous occasions (though as we
shall see, Arrian is later criticised for going astray in other ways).
Schopenhauer also characterises the essence of Stoicism as ‘[spring-
ing] from an incongruity between our desires and the course of the
world’,23 the starting-point of Schopenhauer’s philosophical reflections,
and as attempting to adapt our willing to the way things are, which is also
the desired ultimate result of his soteriological scheme. Finally, Seneca
states, ‘In what does the happy life consist? In safety and unshakeable
peace. This is what is attained by greatness of soul, by a constancy that
adheres to what is correctly discerned’.24 It is hard not to see Schopen-
hauer’s salvific ‘relative nothingness’, beyond the destruction of the Will,
about which very little can be said, reflected here; he writes of coming to
‘the point where we have before our eyes in perfect saintliness… a world
19 Ibid., p. 155.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., p. 156.
22 Ibid., p. 159.
23 Ibid., p. 158.
24 Ibid.
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whose whole existence presented itself to us as suffering’,25 and of an
individual achieving a ‘peace that is higher than all reason, that ocean-
like calmness of the spirit, that deep tranquillity, that unshakeable confid-
ence and serenity’.26
So, what have we learned from our examination of the two passages
on the Stoics from WWR? At the very least, I hope we have learned that
the relation between Schopenhauer and the Stoics is complex. We must, it
seems, attempt to separate Schopenhauer’s critique of Stoicism from that
of the Stoics, something that he systematically fails to do. However, when
we do carefully separate these two critiques, it is impossible to miss that
Stoicism itself, which he characterises as its ‘true spirit’, reflects a large
portion of Schopenhauer’s key philosophical notions and appears to offer
a Schopenhauerian soteriology, though lacking the benefit of later philo-
sophical developments, such as Kantian transcendental idealism. Many
Stoics are led astray by such an absence of philosophical nuance, but that
does not affect Schopenhauer’s views of Stoicism itself.
The final passage on the Stoics we shall look at, arising in the first
volume of Schopenhauer’s Parerga and Paralipomena, does not require
as much comment, but there are a couple of interesting facets of the text
that I would like to briefly highlight. Here, Schopenhauer praises their
theoretical notion of ‘logos spermatikos’, a creative rational principle
working through all things in the universe, including inanimate matter.
Again, he emphasises the use such an idea can be put to in order to
expand our perspective upon our own lives and the world in which we
live. The ‘logos spermatikos’ acts to preserve an identical form through
individuals of the same species, and thus ‘it is that which prevents death,
the destroyer of the individual, from attacking the species’27. Through
such a guarantee that the species will continue beyond the death of any
particular individual, the individual can gain a certain acceptance or
equanimity with regard to their own death – thus, a growth in knowledge
and perspective upon our own existence and life aids the therapeutic
process of coming to terms with suffering and engaging with will-denial.
25 Schopenhauer, WWR, vol. 1, p. 408-09.
26 Ibid., 411.
27 Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipomena, vol. 1, trans. by Payne (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1974), p. 52.
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The rest of the section in PP does not, in fact, engage in a critique
of Stoic ethics at all; rather, it is a defence of what Schopenhauer takes to
be the true spirit of Stoicism in the face of extant texts that conceal or
modify it in some way. As an example, he writes of a text by Stobaeus
that
it is a pedantic, schoolmasterly, thoroughly diffuse, incredibly
dreary, flat, and spiritless exposition of the Stoic morality
without force and life and without any valuable, striking, or
penetrating ideas. In it everything is derived from mere
concepts; nothing is drawn from reality and experience,28
which implies that true Stoicism is none of these things (high praise
indeed from Schopenhauer). In addition, he criticises Arrian on the basis
that ‘every trace of method, systematic treatment, and even orderly
progress’29 is lost from his description of Stoic ethics, again implying that
Stoicism involves all of these positive facets. Schopenhauer goes on to
argue that not only do these texts undermine the true spirit of Stoicism
through their form, they do not even accurately portray the content of
Stoic principles. Arrian is accused of offering ‘a strong foreign admixture
that smacks of a Christian-Jewish source’30 by offering a view of the
world that undermines the true Stoic view of the ultimate unity of all
things and the lack of a personal God, and entirely missing the point of
Stoicism by ‘[preaching] self-renunciation just because it pleases him’.31
By making these criticisms, Schopenhauer is clearly allying himself and
his philosophy with the teachings and practice of ‘true Stoicism’, and is
indeed keen to defend Stoicism from corrupted and inaccurate portrayals
in certain ancient texts.
III
For many readers, there will be an issue that resists any parallel
between Schopenhauer and Stoic thought: namely, the metaphysical trap-
pings of the philosophical system put forward in WWR and elsewhere.
Such features of his system, for example, his claims regarding the identi-
fication of the thing-in-itself with Will, seems to place him at a large
28 Ibid., 53.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., 54.
31 Ibid., 55.
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distance from Stoicism, such that it makes no sense to claim that any
legitimate vestiges of a Stoic philosophical therapy can be found within a
‘metaphysics of Will’. Recent developments in Schopenhauer scholar-
ship, however, suggest that we should perhaps be untroubled by the more
speculative elements of his system. Though I cannot approach this topic
in any great deal in this paper, what is becoming increasingly clear is that
one cannot take these elements at face-value.32
Towards the end of his writings in particular, Schopenhauer begins
to talk more often about the metaphorical aspects of his philosophy; he
appears to retreat from a literal claim to the identification of the thing-in-
itself with Will (by beginning to talk of the term ‘Will’ as a mere label33)
and the unity of being through actions of compassion (in letters, he talks
about that process being described as through a trope34). Through the
influence on his philosophy of Eastern texts, such as the Upanishads, and
an increasing focus on the limits of language and communication, he
comes to see ever more clearly how metaphysical edifices can be
constructed and communicated to bring out long-lasting psychological
change, the kind of change that Stoicism attempts to bring about. This is
still a live debate in the literature;35 however, we can be confident in
seeing some of Schopenhauer’s stronger metaphysical claims as not offer-
32 Work has been recently undertaken to determine the extent to which
Schopenhauer’s philosophy can be interpreted as metaphorical in nature, with the
result that his controversial metaphysics of Will should not be read literally. This is
a rather nascent topic in the literature on Schopenhauer. Including work that I shall
reference in this section, examples of texts that have considered the metaphorical
interpretive line include Jonathan Head, ‘Schopenhauer on the Development of the
Individual’, Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy, 20:2 (2016), pp.427-
446 and David Cartwright, Schopenhauer: A Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), esp. p. 510.
33 See Schopenhauer, WWR, vol. 2, p. 195-198.
34 See Schopenhauer, Gesammelte Briefe, ed. by Hubscher (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag
Herbert Grundmann, 1987), Letter 204.
35 Discussions regarding the metaphorical nature of some of Schopenhauer’s central
pronouncements, such as the identification of the thing-in-itself with Will and the
self-negation of the Will through ascetic practices, can be found in F.C. White, On
Schopenhauer’s Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (New York:
E.J. Brill, 1992); G. Steven Neeley, Schopenhauer – A Consistent Reading
(Lewiston; Queenston; Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, 2003), esp. pp. 64-71; and
G. Steven Neeley, ‘The Consistency of Schopenhauer’s Metaphysics’ in A
Companion to Schopenhauer, ed. by Vandenabeele (Malden, Mass.: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2012), pp. 105-119.
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ing prima facie evidence against deep parallels between his thought and
that of the Stoics. As such, whilst the exact nature of Schopenhauer’s
changing views regarding the literal nature of his metaphysics is still up
for debate, it is clear that it could make a great deal of sense for him to
defend Stoicism, and for someone operating consciously within a
Schopenhauerian tradition to overtly adopt Stoic methods and expres-
sions.
The upshot of all this is that whilst Schopenhauer certainly offers a
therapeutic scheme different in presentation from the Stoics, the two
soteriologies may be much closer in terms of substance. Schopenhauer,
with his notion of a ‘need for metaphysics’, is aware of the importance of
the mode of presentation for therapeutic impact, and presents his system
accordingly, with an elaborate metaphysical scheme that is more likely to
satisfy our drive for transcendent answers and as such to be truly internal-
ised. Schopenhauer believes that without the use of such metaphors, those
on a true path to salvation will inevitably be led astray, and we see this
with the examples of Stoics that he criticises. It is also worth emphasising
the close parallels between Schopenhauer and the Stoics. We have already
seen an emphasis upon the use of reason in the development of a success-
ful philosophical therapy, as well as the Stoic sage offering an ideal that is
at least close to Schopenhauer’s soteriological end-point of the complete
self-denial and negation of the Will. There is also the fact that both
Stoicism and Schopenhauer ultimately see salvation as involving a state
of mind culminating in a complete state of awareness and self-know-
ledge, devoid of painful desires and emotions. We also do not need to
view Schopenhauer’s soteriology as culminating in a destruction of
nature itself, in contrast to the Stoic aim of living in harmony with nature.
If we continue to consider interpreting Schopenhauer’s notion of the
‘self-negation of the Will’ in metaphorical terms, we may come to see
him advocating some form of ‘coming to terms’ with the world in which
we find ourselves, and thereby living the best kind of life that is possible
within it. Of course, these interpretive issues remain tricky for readers of
Schopenhauer, and I do not expect any agreement regarding ‘literal’ and
'metaphorical’ readings any time soon – I simply seek to point out that the
argument for distancing Schopenhauer from a Stoic philosophical therapy
is not as obvious as it may seem at first glance.
IV
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To conclude, we began with a traditional picture of Nietzsche’s
turn away from a Schopenhauerian soteriology towards a Stoic philo-
sophical therapy, particularly in Human, All Too Human. We also noted
that Schopenhauer may have inspired Wittgenstein to adopt a Stoic
ethical ideal, though not perhaps because that ideal in any way forms part
of the philosophy to be found in WWR. I have attempted to put forward
some reasons for challenging these accounts, in that a turn towards
Stoicism can be thought of as a shift of emphasis within the Schopen-
hauerian tradition, as opposed to leaving that tradition behind, on the part
of Nietzsche, and for Wittgenstein, another part of the way in which
Schopenhauer’s system itself inspired him. Indeed, we can go as far as to
suggest that the aspects of Stoic thought in Nietzsche and Wittgenstein
are examples of those who have discovered Stoicism within the context
of Schopenhauer’s philosophical system. We considered three sustained
examinations of Stoicism written at various stages in Schopenhauer’s
philosophical career, and found a continued theme of a defence of the true
spirit of Stoicism, and the criticism of certain Stoics and those who have
written on Stoicism who have both misrepresented or distorted Stoicism
in some way. We also saw the idealised figure of the Stoic sage as being
perhaps one of the most significant figures in Schopenhauer’s system,
unmistakeably reflecting the kind of figure who will at least come close
to absolute will-denial, if not absolutely achieving that perfect state of
self-knowledge.
In addition, I have attempted to reinforce my case by reflecting,
albeit briefly, on the wider picture of Schopenhauer’s philosophical ther-
apy, and have visited some recent work on Schopenhauer that attempts to
deflate some of the more speculative metaphysical elements of his
system, such that he may not be as far from Stoicism as he seems on the
surface. So, what is the significance of this? Certainly, it means that we
need to continue probing into the details of Schopenhauer’s philosophical
therapy, and investigating the parallels that the philosopher himself sees
between his work and ancient Greek thought about how to live the ‘good
life’. Does this mean anything, perhaps, for our understanding of Nietz-
sche in his ‘middle period’? I will certainly not venture any definite
answers to that question at this moment, but I think it is an interesting
avenue of research to approach these texts as standing within something
that is still recognisably a Schopenhauerian framework, something that
has certainly not been done in the past, as far as I’m aware, because of the
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traditional view of Nietzsche turning away from his ‘Educator’ at this
point in his career. What the results of such an investigation would
suggest, I am not sure – perhaps we need to delineate what we might
mean by a ‘Schopenhauerian framework’ even more before we attempt it.
Nevertheless, I am certain that some light would be shed on the ‘middle
period’ works in this way.36
36 Research undertaken for this paper was funded by Keele University and the APRA
Foundation Berlin. My thanks to an audience at the University of Warwick and
anonymous reviewers from this journal for their insightful comments on an earlier
draft of this paper.
